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In his preface to Masaaki Hattori's book Dignåga on Perception (Harvard University Press 
1968; Editor's Foreword p. vi), Daniel H. H. Ingalls makes the following observation: "Indian 
philosophers [at least till some centuries after Dignåga's time] were banded together in small 
groups of teachers and pupils, following set rituals of worship and well-established regiments 
of exercise and meditation. Their writings are directed inward, are addressed to a narrow 
circle of colleagues and pupils, or, in rare cases of outward direction, are concerned with 
refuting the views of other tightly knit groups." This observation is no doubt incorrect in this 
extreme form, and I think Eli Franco is right in criticizing it in the following words (Franco, 
1997: 37 n. 50): "This description (by Ingalls, J.B.) does not seem to be based on any 
external or internal evidence and goes quite contrary to the external evidence, such as the 
reports by the Chinese pilgrims, as well as the internal evidence which clearly shows that 
Indian philosophers were well informed about each other. This in turn presupposes, at least 
on a relative scale, a free circulation of manuscripts and access to well equipped libraries, 
which could only be found in larger monasteries or at kingly courts. It is only because Indian 
philosophers were well informed and openly engaging in a dialogue with rival philosophers, 
that Indological scholarship has been able to establish a quasi unshakable relative chronology 
for almost all Indian philosophers of the first millineum [sic] A.D., even though there are 
                                                
* Earlier versions of this paper were read at the Second International Vedic Workshop, Kyoto 1999, 
and at the International Seminar on Language, Thought and Reality in Bhart®hari on the occasion of 
the Centennial Year of MLBD, New Delhi, 12-14 December 2003. Earlier articles in the series 
“Studies on Bhart®hari” were published in the following journals and volumes: Bulletin d'Études 
Indiennes 6 (1988 [1989]), 105-143 (1: L'auteur et la date de la V®tti); Studien zur Indologie und 
Iranistik 15 (1989), 101-117 (reprint in Studies in M¥måµså: Dr. Mandan Mishra Felicitation 
Volume, ed. R.C. Dwivedi, Delhi 1994, pp. 371-388; 2: Bhart®hari and M¥måµså); Asiatische Studien 
/ Études Asiatiques 45, 1991, 5-18 (3: Bhart®hari on spho†a and universals); Asiatische Studien / 
Études Asiatiques 46 (1)(Études bouddhiques offertes à Jacques May à l'occasion de son soixante-
cinquième anniversaire.), 1992, 56-80 (4: L'absolu dans le Våkyapad¥ya et son lien avec le 
Madhyamaka); Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques 47 (1)(Proceedings of the First International 
Conference on Bhart®hari (University of Poona, January 6-8, 1992)) , 1993, 75-94 (reprint in: 
Bhart®hari, Philosopher and Grammarian, ed. Saroja Bhate and Johannes Bronkhorst, Delhi 1994, pp. 
75-94; 5: Bhart®hari and Vaiße∑ika); Våcaspatyam: Pt. Vamanshastri Bhagwat Felicitation Volume, 
ed. Saroja Bhate and Madhav Deshpande, Pune 1994, pp. 32-41 (6: The author of the Three 
Centuries); Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 76, 1995 [1996], 97-106 (7: 
Grammar as the door to liberation); Journal of Indian Philosophy 27(1/2)(Guruvandana: Essays in 
Indology in Honour of K. Bhattacharya), 1999, pp. 23-33 (8: pråk®ta dhvani and the Såµkhya 
tanmåtras). 
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practically no [100] biographical data for any of them, nor, with very few exceptions, any 
external evidence for an absolute dating." 
 I repeat that I think Franco is right. Indeed, it would be impossible to understand the 
history of Indian philosophy without being aware of the constant interaction between the 
various schools. At the same time the possibility cannot beforehand be excluded that certain 
"philosophical" positions were cultivated in one rather than in another "religious" current. It 
seems certain that at least a number of philosophical traditions were held and preserved in 
family lineages that may have extended over several centuries. According to Gopikamohan 
Bhattacharya, the Mandara family of the Kåßyapagotra in Mithilå produced numerous great 
Naiyåyikas in the course of several centuries (among them Va†eßvara, Íivapati, and 
Yajñapati).1 It is also remarkable that a number of thinker of the "old" Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika 
schools are known to have been Íaivas, or even more specifically Påßupatas; this is true of 
Praßastapåda (probably), Uddyotakara, Bhåsarvajña, Vådi Våg¥ßvara.2 Of most other Nyåya-
Vaiße∑ika thinkers we do not know the religious affiliation. But we may wonder: is it 
conceivable that this school, for at least a part of its existence, was limited to just one 
religious current? Even though no answer to this question may at this moment be possible, 
the question is intriguing. 
 On a higher level of generality, however, it is clear that different schools of thought 
are associated with different currents of religion. All forms of "Buddhist philosophy", for 
example, were elaborated and defended by Buddhists, normally by monks who followed one 
or another of the monastic disciplines (vinaya) of that religion. The Brahmanical philosophies 
were the property of Brahmins belonging to one or another of the Vedic schools. However, 
the moment we try to be more precise, the situation becomes obscure. The link between 
philosophical and disciplinary schools in Buddhism — and the difference between the two — 
is, to be sure, discussed in modern scholarly literature. The link between Brahmanical 
philosophies and religious currents within Brahmanism, including Vedic schools, on the 
other hand, remains unclear. There may be some exceptions — I mentioned the possible link 
between Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika and the Påßupata religion — but they are few in number. 
 One might think that a clear link between Vedic school and philosophy should be 
visible in the case of those Brahmanical philosophies which present themselves as M¥måµså: 
examination of the Veda. The PËrva-M¥måµså in particular has often been linked to the 
Írauta SËtras: many [101] topics dealt with in the M¥måµså SËtra have their counterpart in 
the Írauta SËtras, and occasionally the rules are identical. The Írauta SËtras belong to 
specific Vedic schools. Is there reason to believe that the M¥måµså SËtra and its 
commentaries, too, are linked to one particular Vedic school? I would not expect so. 
                                                
1 Bhattacharya, 1984: 15 sq. 
2 See Bronkhorst, 1996 (Praßastapåda); the final colophon of the Nyåyavårttika (Uddyotakara); 
Ingalls, 1962: 284; Sarma, 1934 (Bhåsarvajña); Raghavan, 1942 (Vådi Våg¥ßvara). 
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Damodar Vishnu Garge (1952: 19-22) pointed out almost half a century ago that Íabara's 
Bhå∑ya, though citing most often from Taittir¥ya texts, contains convincing indications that 
its author, Íabara, was himself a Maitråyaˆ¥ya.3 This suggests that, at any rate at the time of 
Íabara, PËrva-M¥måµså had lost any special link it may have had with the Taittir¥yas, 
supposing that there ever was one. Madhav M. Deshpande, in a recent lecture, cites various 
passages which show that ritualists remained aware of the opposition between the own 
specific Íåkhå and the M¥måµså claim that all Íåkhås teach one and the same ritual act. 
Regarding the M¥måµså SËtra, Asko Parpola (1981: 172) has argued that this text has 
directly grown out of discussions involving two opposing protagonists which were a regular 
institution of each Vedic school in the SËtra period. In other words, the M¥måµså SËtra uses 
discussions that were current in various Vedic schools, but transcends any particular Vedic 
school. 
 Perhaps it is not surprising that a school of thought which deals with, which 
"examines", the whole Veda, not just the version accepted by this or that Vedic school, could 
not, or not for long, be confined to just one Vedic school. Seen in this way, M¥måµså 
exceeds by its very nature the narrow confines of one Vedic school, even if most or all of its 
scholars must have belonged each of them to some such school.4 
 Similar reflections can be made with regard to Íår¥raka-M¥måµså, better known as 
Vedånta or, later, Uttara-M¥måµså. In its classical form this school bases itself on a large 
number of Upani∑ads, belonging to different Vedic schools. The study of all those Upani∑ads 
necessarily goes beyond the territory of any single Vedic school. To this may be added that 
many of the classical authors of Vedånta, first among them Ía∫kara, may have been 
renouncers who had, along with much else, also renounced their affiliation to a particular 
Vedic school. 
[102] 
 Does this mean that our initial question is ill-posed? Do schools of thought by their 
very nature extend beyond the boundaries of one single Vedic school? Perhaps. Only future 
research may be able to answer these questions by collecting data from a variety of thinkers 
and schools. In this paper I wish to concentrate on one thinker and explore to what extent his 
thought may have been influenced, or even determined, by the Vedic school to which he 
belonged. This thinker is Bhart®hari — a Brahmanical philosopher belonging to the fifth 
century of the common era, author of the Våkyapad¥ya and of a commentary, È¥kå, on the 
                                                
3 Garge (1952: 13-14) presents elements from which he concludes that Jaimini was associated with 
the Såmaveda. Parpola (1994: 304), however, points out: “Although Jaimini ... is associated with the 
Såmaveda, it is true that the [PËrva-M¥måµså-SËtra] actually has more to do with the Yajurveda than 
with the Såmaveda.” 
4 Interestingly, Kumårila Bha††a pays hommage, in the introductory stanza of his Ílokavårttika, to 
"Him who wears the crescent moon" (somårdhadhåriˆe), i.e. to Íiva. The commentator Pårthasårathi 
Mißra, perhaps embarrassed by this verse, points out that an interpretation of this term in sacrificial 
terms is also possible: somasya ardhaµ sthånaµ grahacamasådi taddhåriˆe "that which is equipped 
with vessels of Soma" (Ganganath Jha). 
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Mahåbhå∑ya, nowadays often referred to as Mahåbhå∑ya-d¥pikå. The Vedic school to which 
he belonged is that of the Månava-Maitråyaˆ¥yas. Is it possible that this famous thinker may 
have borrowed, or rather inherited, some of his key ideas from this, his own, Vedic tradition? 
 This is indeed possible. The Våkyapad¥ya often invokes tradition, ågama. Vkp 1.30 
states, for example:5 "Without tradition, logic cannot establish virtue (dharma); even the 
knowledge of seers derives from tradition." And Vkp 1.41:6 "He who bases himself on 
tradition ... is not hindered by logical arguments." It seems clear that tradition was very 
important for Bhart®hari. It is even probable that he somehow considered the philosophy 
which he presented in the Våkyapad¥ya to be, at least in part, an expression of traditional 
points of view. But what exactly does he mean by tradition? 
 Unfortunately Bhart®hari's explicit remarks on this matter do not help us much. 
Sometimes the grammatical tradition is clearly envisaged, like in Vkp 1.27:7 "Correct 
[words], which have been established on the basis of cultivated speakers [and] tradition (or: 
on the basis of tradition which comes from cultivated speakers), are a means to [realise] 
dharma. Incorrect [words] are opposite [in their effect], even though there is no difference in 
as far as the expression of meaning is concerned." Sometimes one has the impression that the 
Vaiße∑ika system of philosophy, or a related system, is referred to by the word ågama. An 
example is the following verse from the V®ttisamuddeßa, which discusses the phrase k®∑ˆås 
tilå˙ ‘black sesame seeds’; here an quality (‘black’), a generic property (tilatva) and a 
substance (‘sesame seed’) are distinguished. The verse reads:8 "According [103] to the 
tradition coming from the ancients, three entities (dravyåtman) are therefore separately 
present in the mind, as substrates and what inheres in them." 
 It would be useless to search for one single tradition that fits all the occurrences of the 
word ågama in the Våkyapad¥ya. Bhart®hari recognised several traditions. But we must 
assume that he recognised the Månava-Maitråyaˆ¥ya Vedic school as one of them. (Or 
perhaps better, if we take it that a Vedic school cannot be covered by the word ågama, we 
must assume that he recognized the Månava-Maitråyaˆ¥ya Vedic school as a source of 
authority beside various traditions.)9 Bhart®hari's Vedic quotations show that he belonged to 
this school.10 Moreover, he refers to the manuals of the Månavas without specifying their 
                                                
5 Vkp 1.30: na cågamåd ®te dharmas tarkeˆa vyavati∑†hate/ ®∑¥ˆåm api yaj jñånaµ tad apy 
ågamapËrvakam// 
6 Vkp 1.41: caitanyam iva yaß cåyam avicchedena vartate/ ågamas tam upås¥no hetuvådair na 
bådhyate// 
7 Vkp 1.27: ßi∑†ebhya ågamåt siddhå˙ sådhavo dharmasådhanam/ arthapratyåyanåbhede vipar¥tås tv 
asådhava˙// 
8 Vkp 3.14.20: dravyåtmånas trayas tasmåd buddhau nånå vyavasthitå˙/ åßrayåßrayidharmeˆety 
ayaµ pËrvebhya ågama˙// 
9 The Baudhåyana DharmasËtra (1.1.1 ff.) states that each (ßåkhå of the) Veda teaches the dharma; 
sm®ti (tradition) is the second (source of dharma), the traditional doctrine (ågama) of the ßi∑†as the 
third; see Gonda, 1980: 4. It is not impossible, however, that Bhart®hari may have referred to the 
contents of the Maitråyaˆ¥ya Upani∑ad as ågama; see below. 
10  Rau, 1980; Bronkhorst, 1987. 
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name; he simply refers to their prakaraˆas ‘chapters’. In ritual details he appears to follow the 
teachings of that school.11 We therefore get back to the question: is it conceivable that 
Bhart®hari's philosophy, too, follows at least to some extent the Månava-Maitråyaˆ¥ya 
school? 
 In order to investigate this question, we will have to compare Bhart®hari's ideas with 
ideas current in the Månava-Maitråyaˆ¥ya school. Bhart®hari's ideas are to be found in the 
Våkyapad¥ya, and to a lesser extent in his commentary on the Mahåbhå∑ya. But how do we 
find out which ideas were current among the Månava-Maitråyaˆ¥yas? Which texts have to be 
taken into consideration here? 
 The first and main text that comes to mind is, of course, the Maitråyaˆ¥ya Upani∑ad. 
In order to carry out a comparison between the Våkyapad¥ya and this Upani∑ad, I repeat here 
some important points of Bhart®hari's philosophy as I have presented them in an earlier 
publication.12 They concern the nature of Brahman — i.e. of the absolute — and its 
relationship with the phenomenal world. 
(i) Bhart®hari conceives of Brahman as being the totality of all that exists, including all that 
existed in the past and will exist in the future. 
(ii) Brahman's relationship with the phenomenal world is essentially that of a division. The 
undivided whole is real, single and without modification; its division, i.e. the phenomenal 
world, is unreal, multiform and modified: "[Reality] does not exist and it exists; it is single 
and it is different; it is [104] joined and it is divided; it is modified and it is the opposite of 
that."13 Forms are only found in the phenomenal world: "It is because of time that actions are 
obtained through division, because of space that all forms [are obtained through division]. All 
divisions are based on [reality] which is without divisions."14 The absolute and the 
phenomenal world are therefore no more than two sides of the same entity. Bhart®hari puts it 
as follows: "The tradition [that has come down to us] from the ancients teaches that there is 
no difference between reality and non-reality."15 This last quotation shows that Bhart®hari 
linked this aspect of his doctrine in particular to tradition. 
(iii) The shape of the unreal phenomenal world, i.e. of the division of undivided Brahman, is 
determined by language, more specifically by the divine language, Sanskrit; sometimes 
however it is rather the mind, or thought, which is presented as dividing, or even as creating, 
the phenomenal world. 
(iv) The division of the absolute is accompanied, or even instigated, by certain ‘powers’ 
(ßakti), among which time (kåla) and direction (diß) or space (åkåßa) play an important role. 
                                                
11  Bronkhorst, 1989. 
12  Bronkhorst, 1992. 
13  Vkp 3.2.13: tan nåsti vidyate tac ca tad ekaµ tat p®thak p®thak/ saµs®∑†aµ ca vibhaktaµ ca 
vik®taµ tat tad anyathå// 
14  Vkp 3.7.153: kålåt kriyå vibhajyanta åkåßåt sarvamËrtaya˙/ etåvåµß caiva bhedo 'yam 
abhedopanibandhana˙// 
15  Vkp 3.2.7ab: na tattvåtattvayor bheda iti v®ddhebhya ågama˙/ 
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(v) Bhart®hari's absolute is not identical with consciousness. Consciousness — or perhaps 
better: thought — only plays a role in the division of the world. 
 Are there statements in the Maitråyaˆ¥ya Upani∑ad that correspond to these five 
points? That is to say, are there phrases or passages which may have convinced Bhart®hari 
that his philosophy does not deviate from the Maitråyaˆ¥ya tradition? The Maitråyaˆ¥ya 
Upani∑ad contains the following parallels to the points enumerated above: 
(i) In connection with Bhart®hari's view that Brahman is the totality of all that exists we can 
cite MaitUp 4.6, which states: brahma khalv idaµ våva sarvam "this totality, indeed, is 
Brahman".16 A passage in MaitUp 6.6 speaks of Prajåpati's body "in [which] all this is 
contained, and which is contained in all this" (etasyåm idaµ sarvam antarhitam asmiµß ca 
sarvasminn e∑åntarhiteti). 
(ii) The Maitråyaˆ¥ya Upani∑ad does not speak of a division of Brahman, but it speaks of its 
two aspects in the following passage: "Brahman has two aspects, the one with form, the other 
one without form. [The aspect] with [105] form (mËrta) is unreal (asatya); [the aspect] 
without form (amËrta) is real (satya), it is the [real] Brahman."17  
(iii) The role of language is mentioned in MaitUp 6.6: "This [world] was non-expressed. 
Prajåpati, who is the real, having practised tapas, expressed one after the other bhË˙, bhuva˙, 
sva˙. This [collection of syllables] is the most solid body of Prajåpati."18 Clearer is MaitUp 
6.22-23, from which I choose the following extracts: "One must meditate on two Brahmans, 
the word and the non-word. By the word the non-word is manifested. The word here is OM. 
... For it is said: ‘One must know the two Brahmans: the ßabdabrahman and the one that it 
supreme; he who is versed in ßabdabrahman reaches the supreme Brahman.’ ... The word is 
the syllable OM; its extreme is peaceful, without words, fearless, free from sorrow, blissful, 
satisfied, firm, immutable, immortal, unshakable, permanent."19 
(iv) Bhart®hari's "powers" find a parallel in MaitUp 6.15, which deals with time and its 
relationship to Brahman, and elaborates these notions in typically upani∑adic fashion: 
"Brahman has two aspects, time and non-time. That which is anterior to the sun is non-time, 
without divisions; that which has the sun as antecedent is time, with divisions. The form of 
                                                
16  For the meaning ‘totality’ of sarva see Gonda, 1955, esp. p. 63 [505] f.; 1982. 
17  MaitUp 6.3: dve våva brahmaˆo rËpe mËrtaµ cåmËrtaµ ca/ atha yan mËrtaµ tad asatyam/ yad 
amËrtaµ tat satyaµ tad brahma/. The first half of this quotation ("Brahman has two aspects, the one 
with form, the other one without form") also occurs almost identically at BÓrUp 2.3.1. The 
remainder, which identifies mËrta with asatya and amËrta with satya, has no parallel in the 
B®hadåraˆyaka Upani∑ad, nor anywhere else in Vedic literature. Closest comes MuˆUp 2.1.1-2, 
which identifies ‘the person without form’ (amËrta˙ puru∑a˙) with truth (satyam), without however 
mentioning mËrta and asatya. 
18  MaitUp 6.6: athåvyåh®taµ vå idam ås¥t/ sa satyaµ prajåpatis tapas taptvånuvyåharad bhËr 
bhuva˙ svar iti/ e∑aivåsya prajåpate˙ sthavi∑†hå tanË˙/ 
19  MaitUp 6.22-23: dve våva brahmaˆ¥ abhidhyeye ßabdaß cåßabdaß ca/ atha ßabdenaivåßabdam 
åvi∑kriyate/ atha tatrom iti ßabda˙/ ... evaµ hy åha: 
dve brahmaˆ¥ veditavye ßabdabrahma paraµ ca yat/ ßabdabrahmaˆi ni∑ˆåta˙ paraµ 
brahmådhigacchati// ... ya˙ ßabdas tad om ity etad ak∑aram/ yad asyågraµ tac chåntam aßabdam 
abhayam aßokam ånandaµ t®ptaµ sthiram acalam am®tam acyutaµ dhruvam ... 
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[time] with divisions is the year. From the year these creatures are born; once born with the 
year they grow in this world; in the year they are destroyed."20 Also the remainder of MaitUp 
6.15 as well as 6.16 deal with time. MaitUp 6.17 deals with the spatial aspects of the world: 
"Brahman was here alone at first, infinite to the East, infinite to the South, infinite to the 
West, infinite to the North, infinite upward and downward, in all directions infinite. ... [106] 
He is the åkåßåtman. When all is destroyed, he awakes, alone. Out of this åkåßa he awakens 
this, [which is pure spirit]."21 
(v) This last passage qualifies the world as cetåmåtram ‘pure spirit’. It is however to be noted 
that this expression qualifies the world that is awakened, not Brahman the awakener. Like 
Bhart®hari, the Maitråyaˆ¥ya Upani∑ad never identifies Brahman and consciousness, contrary 
to certain other Upani∑ads.  
 
The parallels just indicated should not make us jump to the conclusion that Maitråyaˆ¥ya 
influence on Bhart®hari has now been proved beyond doubt. In fact, the text here referred to 
as Maitråyaˆ¥ya Upani∑ad is a composite work — variously known by the names Maitri 
(Maitr¥), Maitråyaˆa, and Maitråyaˆ¥ya Upani∑ad — whose connection with the Maitråyaˆ¥ya 
school is subject to doubt. J.A.F. van Buitenen has been able to show (1962) that the present 
Maitråyaˆ¥ya Upani∑ad is the result of combining two originally independent texts, an 
original Maitråyaˆ¥ya Upani∑ad that did belong to the Vedic school of that name, and another 
text which he calls the Southern Maitråyaˆ¥ and which is "without apparent Vedic 
relationships" (p. 21); editorial changes were subsequently added to this combined text. van 
Buitenen says nothing about the date or dates when these changes took place, but it seems a 
priori most likely — in view both of his early date and his Vedic affiliation — that Bhart®hari 
was acquainted with the original Maitråyaˆ¥ya Upani∑ad, even though it cannot be 
completely excluded that he knew the inflated Upani∑ad, the one which we have now, and 
looked upon it as a Maitråyaˆ¥ya text. 
 The problem is that the first of the five points discussed above has only parallels in 
portions that do not belong to the original Maitråyaˆ¥ya Upani∑ad. MaitUp 4.6, which 
identifies Brahman with the totality of what there is, is according to van Buitenen an editorial 
interpolation which was added after original Maitråyaˆ¥ya and Southern Maitråyaˆ¥ had been 
combined to make a new text. The portion of MaitUp 6.6 which expresses itself in a similar 
manner with regard to Prajåpati's body appears to be an editorial interpolation made under 
the influence of a passage in the Southern Maitråyaˆ¥, and therefore once again posterior to 
                                                
20  MaitUp 6.15: dve våva brahmaˆo rËpe kålaß cåkålaß ca/ atha ya˙ pråg ådityåt so 'kålo 'kala˙/ atha 
ya ådityådya˙ sa kåla˙ sakala˙/ sakalasya vå etad rËpaµ yat saµvatsaram/ saµvatsaråt khalv evemå˙ 
prajå˙ prajåyante/ saµvatsareˆeha vai jåtå vivardhante/ saµvatsare pratyastaµ yanti/ 
21  MaitUp 6.17: brahma ha vå idam agra ås¥d eko 'nanta˙ pråg ananto dak∑iˆato 'nanta˙ prat¥cy ananta 
ud¥cy ananta Ërdhvaµ cåvå∫ ca sarvato 'nanta˙/ .../ e∑a åkåßåtmaiva/ e∑a k®tsnak∑aya eko jågarti iti/ 
etasmåd åkåßåd e∑a khalv idaµ ... bodhayati/. For the interpretation of åkåßåtman, cp. TaitUp 1.6: 
åkåßaßar¥raµ brahma. 
________________  8 
 
 
 
 July 18, 2010 
the combination of the two texts. Add to this that various other texts describe Brahman, 
sometimes Prajåpati, as the totality of all that exists; examples are ChånUp 3.14.1, BÓrUp 
2.4.6, 2.5, 4.5.7, 5.3, MuˆUp 2.2.12, ÍPaBr 7.3.1.42, Kau∑Br 6.15, 25.12, Bhag 11.40. 
[107] 
 Also the word cetåmåtram, cited to illustrate point (v), is an interpolation according to 
van Buitenen (p. 48). The remaining points have each at least one relevant citation in the 
original Maitråyaˆ¥ya Upani∑ad. 
 The only conclusion that can be drawn from the above is that the original 
Maitråyaˆ¥ya Upani∑ad may have exerted a formative influence on Bhart®hari's thought, but 
this is not certain. 
 
There is another text that might conceivably preserve ‘philosophical’ or ‘cosmological’ ideas 
that were current in Bhart®hari's Vedic school, and which therefore has to be taken into 
consideration here. In another publication I have drawn attention to the fact that Bhart®hari, in 
his commentary on the Mahåbhå∑ya, simply uses the expression prakaraˆa ‘chapter’ where 
he refers to manuels of his own Vedic school, that of the Månava-Maitråyaˆ¥yas. On one 
occasion he uses this same expression while citing a verse that must have belonged to a work 
on Dharma. It can be concluded from this that Bhart®hari knew a Månava Dharmaßåstra.22 
However, the verse he cites at this place does not occur in our Manusm®ti, so that it is clear 
that the Månava Dharmaßåstra which Bhart®hari knew was not identical with our Manusm®ti. 
It is however conceivable that the text he knew — which belonged to the Vedic school of the 
Månava-Maitråyaˆ¥yas — was the (or a) predecessor of our Manusm®ti which, as is well-
known, is no longer the exclusive property of any one school.23 Let us see whether Bhart®hari 
shares ideas with the Manusµrti. 
 The part of the Manusm®ti that might be of particular interest in this connection is its 
first book which, as Lingat (1967: 95) observed, is nothing but an introduction which 
contains nothing corresponding to it in the DharmasËtras.24 This introduction contains, 
among other things, a description of the creation of the world, and it is here that we might 
conceivably find traces of the ‘cosmological’ tradition of the Månavas. A feature that strikes 
us immediately is that the eternal and non-manifested cause of the world is here characterized 
as sadasadåtmaka ‘being by nature real and unreal’.25 (Íloka 12.118, too, characterizes ‘the 
                                                
22  Bronkhorst, 1985. 
23  Bühler's earlier attempts to show that the Manusm®ti must be the descendant of an earlier, now lost, 
Månava DharmasËtra, did not convince scholars; cp. Alsdorf, 1962: 22 (852) f. 
24  There is, on the other hand, much that corresponds to the contents of the first book of the 
Manusm®ti in the Puråˆas; see Jahn, 1904. 
25  Manu 1.11ab: yat tat kåraˆam avyaktaµ nityaµ sadasadåtmakam. This line is "out of place here" 
and the result of a modernisation of the text, as Paul Hacker (1963: 79 (391)) rightly points out. As 
we are not in a position to determine the date of this modernisation, it cannot be excluded (but nor can 
it be proved) that this line belonged already to the Månava precursor of the Manusm®ti. For similar 
passages in the Puråˆas, see Kirfel, 1927: 2 (Textgruppe I, verse 3), 7 (IIA, 1.4,5), 45 (IIB, 1.8). 
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all’ as ‘real and [108] unreal’ (sarvam ... sac cåsac ca).) This characterization of reality 
occurs, as we have seen, in the Maitråyaˆ¥ya Upani∑ad and in the Våkyapad¥ya, but also 
elsewhere (e.g. Bhag 11.37). The Maitråyaˆ¥ya Upani∑ad and the Våkyapad¥ya assign form 
(mËrti) to the phenomenal world, conceiving ultimate reality as being without form. The 
Manusm®ti does not do so, at least not in the same explicit manner, but something similar 
may perhaps be found at Manusm®ti 1.55-56, which speaks of the creator who periodically 
loses his form and adopts another one: "Lodging in darkness, he remains there with the 
sensory powers for a long time and does not engage in his own innate activity; and then he 
moves out from that physical form. He becomes the size of an atomic particle and enters into 
the seed of what moves and of what is still; and when he has united [with that] he leaves his 
[former] physical form."26 
 Beside this point, there are some other agreements between the Maitråyaˆ¥ya 
Upani∑ad and the Manusm®ti, which we will now turn to. 
 MaitUp 1.2 announces in its final sentence a gåthå. Two then following passages are 
not in verse, but they resemble Manu 6.76-77, which is. MaitUp 1.3b-c reads: 
 
bhagavann 
asthicarmasnåyumajjåßukraßoˆitaßle∑måßrudË∑ikåviˆmËtravåtapittakaphasaµghåte 
durgandhe ni˙såre 'smiñ ßar¥re kiµ kåmopabhogai˙/ 
kåmakrodhalobhamohabhayavi∑åder∑ye∑†aviyogåni∑†asaµprayogak∑utpipåsåjaråm®ty
urogaßokådyair abhihate 'smiñ char¥re kiµ kåmopabhogai˙/  
"Sir, in this evil-smelling body, conglomeration of bones, skin, sinews, marrow, 
semen, blood, phlegm, tears, eye-secretion, feces, urine, wind, bile, and phlegm, 
devoid of all essence, how can one enjoy desires? 
In this body, which is a prey to lust, wrath, greed, perplexity, fear, despair, envy, 
parting with the loved and meeting with the unloved, hunger, thirst, senility, death, 
sickness, and other sorrows, how can one enjoy desires?" (tr. van Buitenen, 1962: 
124) 
 
It is possible that the passage numbered MaitUp 1.3a in the edition by van Buitenen 
immediately preceded these two passages; it may also have been added later.27 It reads: 
 
ßar¥ram idaµ ... asthibhi˙ citaµ måµsenåbhiliptaµ carmaˆåvabaddhaµ (or: 
°naddhaµ) viˆmËtravåtapittakaphamajjåmedovasåbhir anyaiß ca malair bahubhi˙ 
paripËrˆam 
"This body ... is piled up with bones, smeared over with flesh, bundled up with skin, 
and filled with feces, urine, wind, bile, phlegm, marrow, lymph, fat and with many 
other kinds of filth." (tr. van Buitenen, 1962: 123-124) 
[109] 
Consider now the two verses from the Manusm®ti (6.76-77):28 
                                                
26  Manu 1.55-56: tamo 'yaµ tu samåßritya ciraµ ti∑†hati sendriya˙/ na ca svaµ kurute karma 
tadotkråmati mËrtita˙// yadåˆumåtriko bhËtvå b¥jaµ sthåsnu cari∑ˆu ca/ samåvißati saµs®∑†as tadå 
mËrtiµ vimuñcati//. Tr. Doniger and Smith, 1991: 9. 
27  For a discussion see van Buitenen, 1962: 74 f.; and Horsch, 1966: 199-200. 
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asthisthËˆaµ snåyuyutaµ måµsaßoˆitalepanam/ carmåvanaddhaµ durgandhi pËrˆaµ 
mËtrapur¥∑ayo˙// jaråßokasamåvi∑†aµ rogåyatanam åturam/ rajasvalam anityaµ ca 
bhËtåvåsam imaµ tyajet// 
"He should abandon this foul-smelling, tormented, impermanent dwelling-place of 
living beings, filled with urine and excrement, pervaded by old age and sorrow, 
infested by illness, and polluted by passion, with bones for beams, sinews for cords, 
flesh and blood for plaster, and skin for the roof." 
 
It would be going too far to maintain that these two verses from the Manusm®ti originally 
occupied the place of the passages from the Maitråyaˆ¥ya Upani∑ad considered above. The 
use of the word gåthå just before indicated nevertheless that a verse was found at that place at 
some time. The similarity between the verses and the passages is moreover undeniable. To 
explain this by assuming that a common tradition underlies both is not therefore altogether 
improbable.29 
 Consider next the beginning of MaitUp 2.2:  
 
atha ya e∑occhvåsåva∑†ambhanenordhvam utkrånto vyathamåno/vyayamåno 
'vyathamånas/'vyayamånas tama˙ praˆudaty e∑a åtm[å] 
"He, who with the reliance on the breath goes out upward, and is restless, yet, when 
not restless, dispelles the darkness, he is the self." (tr. van Buitenen, 1962: 125) 
 
van Buitenen (1962: 125 n. 13) compares this passage with Manu 1.6 (tata˙ svayaµbhËr 
bhagavån avyakto vyañjayann idam/ mahåbhËtådi v®ttaujå˙ prådur ås¥t tamonuda˙) and asks 
the question whether vyathamåna/vyayamåna of the Maitråyaˆ¥ya Upani∑ad replaces an 
original vyañjyamåna. This proposal rests on the unexpressed idea that a special link 
connects these two texts.  
 The similarities just considered between the Manusm®ti and the Maitråyaˆ¥ya 
Upani∑ad have one fatal flaw. The Maitråyaˆ¥ya passages concerned do not belong to the 
original Maitråyaˆ¥ya Upani∑ad as reconstituted by van Buitenen. They are part of what he 
calls the Southern Maitråyaˆ¥. This means that we must either believe that the Southern 
Maitråyaˆ¥ and the original Maitråyaˆ¥ya were already combined before the time the original 
Månava Dharmaßåstra was composed, or conclude that the features considered do not 
constitute evidence supporting the originally Maitråyaˆ¥ya nature of the Manusm®ti. 
[110] 
                                                                                                                                                  
28  These same verses also occur Mhbh 12.316.42-43, with this difference, that verse 43d here reads: 
bhËtåvåsaµ samuts®ja. Horsch (1966: 198 f.) cites further parallels from the Påli Buddhist canon and 
from the Mahåbhårata. 
29  Horsch (1966: 202) suggests the following historical reconstruction: "1. Eine gåthå buddhistischen 
Inhalts über den zusammengesetzten, ekelerregenden Aspekt des Körpers. 2. Erweiterung durch eine 
zweite Strophe über das Wesen des Leidvollen, der buddhistischen Wahrheit vom Leiden 
entsprechend. Beide Punkte finden eine Parallele in den zwei Versen von MBh und Manu. 3. 
Verderbnis des Metrums durch Prosaeinschübe, die wahrscheinlich durch buddhistische 
Begriffsreihen ... inspiriert wurden. ..." 
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We fare slightly better when considering possible parallels between the Manusm®ti and the 
Våkyapad¥ya. Both texts deal with the central role which the Veda plays in the creation of the 
world. Vkp 1.10 calls the Veda ‘creator of the worlds’ (vidhåtus tasya lokånåm); Manu 1.21 
explains that the names, activities and conditions of all things were made in accordance with 
the words of the Veda.30 Another shared feature is their shared aversion of logical reasoning 
that is independent of tradition. This comes out clearly when we compare Manu 12.106 and 
Vkp 1.151ab. The Våkyapad¥ya has: 
 
vedaßåstråvirodh¥ ca tarkaß cak∑ur apaßyatåm/  
"Logical reasoning, when not in contradiction with the Veda,31 is the eye of those 
who cannot see." 
 
The same idea is expressed in Manu 12.106: 
 
år∑aµ dharmopadeßaµ ca vedaßåstråvirodhinå/ yas tarkeˆånusaµdhatte sa dharmaµ 
veda netara˙//  
"The man who uses reason which does not contradict the teachings of the Veda to 
investigate the sages' [Veda] and the instructions about duty (dharma) — he alone, 
and no one else, knows duty." 
 
One could further compare Vkp 1.30, which reads: na cågamåd ®te dharmas tarkeˆa 
vyavati∑†hate "Without tradition, dharma is not determined by reasoning."32 
 Do these parallels justify the conclusion that Bhart®hari borrowed the notion of the 
Veda as creator of the world and his distrust with regard to logical reasoning from the 
Månava-Maitråyaˆ¥ya tradition, the same tradition that also find expression in the verses of 
the Manusm®ti just cited? This is far from certain. Both the notion of the Veda as creator of 
the world and distrust of logical reasoning are too general to allow of any precise 
conclusions.33 Moreover, the historical connection between the lost Månava [111] 
                                                
30  Manu 1.21: sarve∑åµ tu sanåmåni karmåˆi ca p®thak p®thak/ vedaßabdebhya evådau p®thak 
saµsthåß ca nirmame//. Cp. KËrmapuråˆa 1.7.64: nåma rËpaµ ca bhËtånåµ k®tyånåµ ca 
prapañcanam/ vedaßabdebhya evådau nirmame sa maheßvara˙// 
31  The word ßåstra can refer to the Veda, as is clear from Vkp 1.43 ab, which juxtaposes the ak®taka 
ßåstra and the sm®ti. 
32  Cp. further Manu 2.11: yo 'vamanyeta te mËle hetußåstråßayåd dvija˙/ sa sådhubhir bahi∑kåryo 
nåstiko vedanindaka˙// "Any twice-born man who disregards these two roots (of religion [viz. ßruti 
and sm®ti]) because he relies on the teachings of logic should be excommunicated by virtuous people 
as an atheist an a reviler of the Veda"; and Manu 4.30: på∑aˆ∂ino vikarmasthån bai∂ålavratikåñ 
cha†hån/ haitukån bakav®tt¥µß ca vå∫måtreˆåpi nårcayet// "He should not give honour, even with 
mere words, to heretics, people who persist in wrong action, people who act like cats, hypocrites, 
logicians, and people who live like herons" Tr. Doniger & Smith, 1991: 77, modified. 
33  The notion of the creative power of the words of the Veda is fairly common. We find it, for 
example, in the Anug¥tå, in a passage which Deussen (1906: p. 908 verse 9) translates in the 
following manner: "Aus jenem [dem Erkenner, d.h. dem Ótman] ist hervorgegangen der Herr der 
Rede [das ewige, weltschaffende Vedawort]; auf ihn [auf das Vedawort] blickt das Manas [der 
Weltschaffende Wille] hin, und die Gestalt [der Aussendinge] entsteht; das Manas läuft hinter dem 
Buchstaben [des Veda] her [d.h. die Dinge werden im Hinblick auf das ewige Vedawort geschaffen]." 
(Mhbh 14.21.4 reads, in the critical edition: tato våcaspatir jajñe samåna˙ paryavek∑ate/ rËpam 
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Dharmaßåstra and the surviving Manusm®ti is far from clear, and may indeed be non-existent. 
The claim has even been made that "the author of the Manu Sm®ti ... was probably a follower 
of the Íå∫khåyana Íåkhå of the Ùg Veda and not a follower of Maitråyaˆ¥ya Månava 
Íåkhå".34 
 However, there is evidence to think that the Månavas in particular had at some time a 
reputation for being distrustful of logical reasoning not agreeing with the Vedic tradition.35 It 
occurs in a passage from the Arthaßåstra of Kau†ilya. The subject-matter is ånv¥k∑ik¥, a term 
which has recently drawn the attention of scholars.36 It refers to a rational methodology 
which is applicable in various domains, such as "science of the three Vedas" (tray¥), the 
"science of material welfare" (i.e., trade and agriculture) (vårttå), and "science of government 
and politics" (daˆ∂an¥ti). Following Halbfass, I will translate it "investigative science". The 
Arthaßåstra specifies that ånv¥k∑ik¥ is useful for people in that it investigates with reasons 
what is right and wrong in the field of Vedic knowledge, what is advantageous and 
disadvantageous in the science of material acquisitions, and appropriate or inappropriate in 
the science of government, and moreover, the strengths and weaknesses of these three 
sciences.37 The paragraph concerned begins with the following observations:38 
 
Investigative science (ånv¥k∑ik¥), the science of the three Vedas (tray¥), the science of 
material welfare (vårttå) and the science of government and politics [112] (daˆ∂an¥ti) 
are the sciences (vidyå). According to the Månavas, [only] the science of the 
three Vedas, the science of material welfare and the science of government and 
politics are sciences, given that investigative science is  a special case of 
the science of the three Vedas. 
 
Read by itself, the remark to the extent that investigative science is a special case of Vedic 
science is obscure. Read in combination with the passages just considered of the 
Våkyapad¥ya and of the Manusm®ti it invites the following interpretation: investigative 
                                                                                                                                                  
bhavati vai vyaktam tad anudravate mana˙// (Deussen must have read taµ mana˙ paryavek∑ate in 
påda b) 
34  Smith (1989:198 n. 91) observes: "It is likely that the similarity between the classification system 
in the [Íå∫khåyana G®hya SËtra] and that in Manu is not just coincidental. Ram Gopal, in ‘Manu's 
indebtedness to Íå∫khåyana,’ Poona Orientalist 27 (1962): 39-44, analyzes a number of parallel 
passages in the two texts and concludes that ‘the author of the Manu Sm®ti who drew upon the 
Íå∫khåyana G®hya SËtra ... was probably a follower of the Íå∫khåyana Íåkhå of the Ùg Veda and not 
a follower of Maitråyaˆ¥ya Månava Íåkhå.’ The question of Manu's Vedic affiliation, if any, remains 
controversial, however." 
35  Lindtner (1993: 207) observes: "The hostile attitude towards ‘dry logicians’ (tårkika) is by no 
means specific to Manu and the [Våkyapad¥ya]. According to Någårjuna, for instance, even the 
Buddha took exception to tårkika-s." In a footnote he refers to Lokåt¥tastava 21, in his Nagarjuniana, 
p. 134. However, it is open to question whether this verse really expresses a hostile attitude towards 
logicians, and it certainly is not distrustful of logical reasoning not agreeing with the Vedic tradition. 
36  See Halbfass, 1988: 274 f. 
37  Arthaßåstra 1.2.11: dharmådharmau trayyåm arthånarthau vårttåyåµ nayåpanayau daˆ∂an¥tyåµ 
balåbale caitåsåµ hetubhir anv¥k∑amåˆå lokasyopakaroti. Halbfass, 1988: 275. 
38  Arthaßåstra 1.2.1-3: ånv¥k∑ik¥ tray¥ vårttå daˆ∂an¥tiß ceti vidyå˙/ tray¥ vårttå daˆ∂an¥tiß ceti 
månavå˙/ tray¥viße∑o hy ånv¥k∑ik¥ti/ 
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science has no place outside Vedic science, and should never be allowed to lead to 
conclusions that contradict the Veda.  
 
What can we conclude from the preceding? Not very much, I fear. It seems possible, even 
likely, that Bhart®hari looked upon his Vedic school, that of the Månava-Maitråyaˆ¥yas, as 
one of his sources of inspiration which he refers to as authoritative tradition, ågama. The 
specific texts belonging to that tradition which he used probably include the Maitråyaˆ¥ya 
Upani∑ad. He also used other treatises of the Månava school, among them probably a 
Månava Dharmaßåstra. Whether he derived philosophical ideas from these treatises is not 
clear. The Manusm®ti — assuming that it is based on the Månava Dharmaßåstra known to 
Bhart®hari — does not provide much information that might support this. 
 The observation that Bhart®hari probably used the Maitråyaˆ¥ya Upani∑ad and drew 
inspiration from it, might of course be interpreted differently from the way suggested here. 
One might surmise that he considered himself a Vedåntin who, for that reason, looked upon 
all Upani∑ads as authoritative. The fact that Bhart®hari uses somewhere in his Våkyapad¥ya 
the expression trayyantavedin (Vkp 3.3.72), which may mean vedåntin,39 suggests that he 
may have known people who based their philosophical opinions on all, or at least a certain 
number of Upani∑ads, not just on the Upani∑ad belonging to their own school. 
 However, some factors go against such an assumption. To begin with, Bhart®hari does 
not, as Ashok Aklujkar has rightly pointed out (1991: 4), turn to the Upani∑ads as ßruti 
sources of philosophical views.40 Indeed, he does not cite a single Upani∑adic passage, 
neither in his Våkyapad¥ya nor in [113] his commentary on the Mahåbhå∑ya.41 What is more, 
Bhart®hari is, beside with Vedånta, also acquainted with the school of (PËrva-)M¥måµså. 
However, for ritual details he does not draw on M¥måµså but on the Månava-Maitråyaˆ¥ya 
tradition, as pointed out above.42 M¥måµså and Vedånta (also called PËrva-M¥måµså and 
Uttara-M¥måµså respectively) resemble each other in that the former bases itself on the 
Vedic Bråhmaˆa texts of all schools, and the latter on the Upani∑ads belonging to all schools. 
Since Bhart®hari attached apparently more importance to the ritual practices of his own 
school than to all the others, it seems likely that he also attached more importance to his 
"own" Upani∑ad than to the philosophical school which derived its knowledge from all 
                                                
39  For a discussion see Houben, 1995: 293 f. 
40  Aklujkar is furthermore of the opinion that Bhart®hari's use of the expression trayyanta does not go 
against the conclusion that the Upani∑ads do not seem to enjoy in Bhart®hari's thinking any special 
status as a body of literature particularly important for a philosopher, this because, in Aklujkar's 
opinion, this expression does not seem to refer to the Upani∑ads (at least not primarily or exclusively), 
but to a literature whose nucleus or definitive content could have been what we find in works like the 
Brahma-sËtras. However, Aklujkar bases this conclusion on the three occurrences of the expression 
trayyanta in the V®tti (on Vkp 1.10; 2.22; 2.233) which was probably not composed by Bhart®hari 
himself; cp. Houben, 1998. 
41  See Rau, 1980, esp. p. 178, for a list of Vedic passages cited in these two works. 
42  Note 11, with reference to Bronkhorst, 1989. 
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Upani∑ads combined. The very fact that Bhart®hari writes explicitly as a Månava-
Maitråyaˆ¥ya — which reveals itself, not so much by his preference for Maitråyaˆ¥ya Vedic 
quotations, but above all by his habit to refer to Månava-Maitråyaˆ¥ya texts (and only to 
those) without specification that he does so — further supports the view that the Månava-
Maitråyaˆ¥ya tradition was for him much more important than the other Upani∑ads. 
 
[114] 
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